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THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY OF SILENCE
Bennett Gershman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors enjoy a broad array of opportunities to communicate
with the public outside the courtroom. Justice Holmes's famous
dictum-that "[t]he theory of our system is that the conclusions to
be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument
. . . and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print"l-is just that, a theory. The reality is otherwise.
Prosecutors, and defense lawyers too, engage in extrajudicial speech
But in contrast to other
frequently, and often irresponsibly.
lawyers, prosecutors have a higher-a "special"-duty to serve
justice rather than a private client. 2 Yet prosecutor speech~ig
ubiquitous, often carefully orchestrated, and very often hardhitting. With the collaboration of the media, prosecutors hold press
conferences and issue press releases, give briefings and interviews
with reporters, post Internet and Twitter comments, appear as TV
"experts," speak in public forums, and write books about their
exploits. 3 They have also used the notorious "perp walk" as a form
of communication and have been known to leak confidential
4
information.
As Justice Holmes intimated, a prosecutor's public statements are
potentially dangerous. Given a prosecutor's high standing with the
public as a "Champion of Justice" sworn to uphold the law and
punish wrongdoers, a prosecutor has a unique ability to shape
public opinion not only about fighting crime but also about specific
* Professor of Law, Pace University.

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
§ 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 4th ed. 2015) ("The
primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to
convict."); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 3d ed. 2009)
("The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice .... "); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2002) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
3 See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2, I.B.3, I.B.5, I.B.6.
4 See infra Sections I.B.4, I.B.7.
2 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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individuals who may be under investigation and prosecution. And
with the ability of the media to saturate the public with pervasive,
repetitive, and often inflammatory news coverage about a case, a
prosecutor's public statements almost always have the potential to
prejudice future jurors in that case and thereby inflict prejudice to
persons suspected or charged with wrongdoing. 5
Indeed, a
prosecutor's public statements can destroy a person's reputation,
prejudice his right to a fair trial, and undermine the public's respect
for the way the criminal law is administered. And most tragically, a
prosecutor's public statements can contribute to the conviction of
6
innocent persons.
The power of the prosecutor, combined with the influence of the
media, makes for a dangerous combination.
The symbiotic
relationship between prosecutors and the media is well known.
While banner headlines and incendiary news coverage garner
prosecutors free publicity and significant leverage in getting
convictions, 7 the close collaboration with prosecutors gives the
media special access to confidential information and the ability to
break stories and then spin them to a large and receptive audience.
To be sure, some prosecutor speech is legitimate and necessary.
Speech by prosecutors may serve significant public interestsinforming the public about law enforcement initiatives, alerting the
public to dangerous situations, and seeking assistance from the
pubic in investigating crimes and fugitives. But a considerable
amount of prosecutor speech is illegitimate, unnecessary, and
prejudicial. When a prosecutor campaigns on the death penalty, or
the rights of victims, or testifies before a legislative body on law

5 See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, ProsecutorialSound Bites: When do They Cross the Line?,
44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2010) ("[Tjhe ethical rules have been fairly ineffective in
restraining prosecutors from remarks that have a substantial possibility of affecting public
opinion of the defendant before trial."); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Incautious Media, Free
Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More Realistic Guidance in Dealing with
the Press, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 1285, 1287 (2011) (noting that risks to a defendant's reputation
and receiving a fair trial from extrajudicial comments by prosecutors in high-profile cases
"always exist" and are "substantial."). See R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutorand the Press:
Lessons (Not) Learned from the Mike Nifong Debacle, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67, 68 (2008)
("Several of the statements that [the prosecutor] admittedly made to the media about the
rape investigation ... seem entirely consistent with a prosecutor's duty to inform the public
about the priorities of his office, the nature and status of criminal cases, and the reasons for
the discretionary law-enforcement decisions he has made ....
These are the very types of
statements that prosecutors across the country routinely make about pending criminal cases
in order to keep their communities informed about threats to public safety and the ongoing
enforcement activities of government officials.").
6 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 5, at 1295.
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enforcement initiatives to fight terrorism, there may be no direct
and specific prejudice to any pending or impending prosecution.
However, when a prosecutor comments about specific cases,
discusses the evidence and the defendant's character, and offers
opinions about the credibility of witnesses and the defendant's guilt,
the prosecutor crosses the line.
Admittedly, the line between legitimate and illegitimate
prosecutor speech is not clear-cut. A prosecutor who seeks to inform
the public about law enforcement initiatives against terrorismundoubtedly a legitimate topic-may intentionally or inadvertently
identify individuals who are suspected of being part of a terrorist
cell, link them to a broader terrorist conspiracy, and opine on the
strength of the government's evidence. 8 And if these individuals are
later charged with criminal conduct, their right to a fair trial may
Further, the
be compromised by the prosecutor's comments. 9
occasional efforts of courts and disciplinary bodies to hedge
prosecutor speech, especially speech that flirts near the line, is often
frustrated by vague legal and ethical standards, as well as the
ability of some prosecutors to find ways within those standards to
circumvent limitations on their speech. For these reasons, although
prosecutors occasionally are disciplined for speech that violates the
rules, 10 or chastised by the courts,11 sanctioning prosecutors for
8 See United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Mich. 2003) for a discussion
of two "lamentable incidents" in which United States Attorney General John Ashcroft made
extrajudicial statements and erroneously stated that three defendants arrested for terrorism
were "suspected of having knowledge of the September 11th attacks" and referred to the
testimony of a cooperating government witness in the case as having "been of value,
substantial value," to the Government's case.
9 See Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get it Wrong - Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case,
44 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 339-40 (2005), which discusses the Koubriti trial and how "[flollowing
a nine-month review, the government filed a memorandum ... conceding that the convictions
were flawed," that the lead witness was not credible, and that "the jury's determination was
impaired" by prosecutorial misconduct.
10 See, e.g., In re Members of the State Bar of Ariz., No. PDJ-2011-9002, at 232 (Ariz. S. Ct.
April 10, 2012) (suspending and disbarring various members of the Arizona Bar for violating
the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct); In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1249 (Ind. 2012)
(imposing public reprimand on prosecutor for his "professional misconduct"); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 574, 575 (Md. 2003) (recommending reprimand
of prosecutor for his out of court statements that could have likely prejudiced the outcome of
numerous criminal trials); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1991) (sustaining Letter
of Reprimand against District Attorney for releasing a letter to the public accusing a judge of
misconduct); In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (censuring the
district attorney for publicly criticizing the judge's decision in a pending criminal case);
Zimmerman v. Bd. of Profl Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757, 758, 763 (Tenn. 1989) (sustaining
the hearing committee's verdict finding the prosecutor to be in violation of professional rules
when he spoke to the press about pending proceedings); N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC
35 (N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (disbarring an attorney for extrajudicial statements made
to the press that were likely to affect a pending case).
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irresponsible speech is infrequent and often ad hoc. And hanging in
the balance, of course, is the ever-present risk that unregulated or
weakly-regulated prosecutor speech continues to impair the fair and
evenhanded functioning of the criminal justice system, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the system, and the
reputation and liberty of persons thrust into the system and facing
12
the glare of public accusation and prosecution.
Prosecutor speech is not fungible. Application of the legal and
ethical rules that regulate a prosecutor's extrajudicial statements
depends on the role the prosecutor is performing when engaging in
public speech. When communicating with the public, a prosecutor
occupies three distinct roles. First, a prosecutor in the vast majority
of U.S. jurisdictions is an elected official who, when campaigning for
office, has the right to inform the public about the qualities and
characteristics that make him and his office the best-qualified for
the position. 13 Second, a prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement

"
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966) ("The prosecution repeatedly
made evidence available to the news media which was never offered at trial. Much of the
'evidence' disseminated in this fashion was clearly inadmissible."); United States v. Bowen,
799 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing the court's dissatisfaction with the Assistant
U.S. Attorney's public postings regarding pending matters); Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d
1200, 1203 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that an Assistant U.S. Attorney's statements to the press
were prejudicial to the pending matter); Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.
1957) ("[The prosecutor's] failure to apprehend the natural result of his act is as damaging to
the cause of justice as if he had failed in his duty to act with a scrupulous regard for
fairness."); United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93(VEC), 2015 WL 1608412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 10, 2015) ("[T]he Court does not condone the Government's brinksmanship relative to
the Defendant's fair trial rights or the media blitz orchestrated by the U.S. Attorney's Office.
..");
United
.
States v. Corbin, 620 F. Supp. 2d 400, 411 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (suggesting that the
prosecutor may have violated disciplinary rules by offering opinions about the evidence);
Jovanovic v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 8437(PAC), 2006 WL 2411541, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2006) ("Following the arraignment, [the prosecutor] made 'highly inflammatory and
prejudicial remarks about Jovanovic to the press."'); Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 725, 744
(finding that U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft violated a court order governing public
communications by making inflammatory, prejudicial, and extrajudicial statements about a
pending trial); United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he conduct
of the government officers who disclosed information [regarding] the investigation was
grossly improper and possibly illegal ....");State v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 854, 855 (Vt.
1980) (stating that the court condemned the misconduct of the prosecutor campaigning for reelection in making a campaign pledge to prosecute a named individual).
12 See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987)
("Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the
prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state in
scrutinizing any given individual.").
13 See, e.g., R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 116 (2005) ("[T]he public has a
right to be kept informed about how a prosecutor is using public resources, and what choices
he is making about enforcement priorities ....
As a public servant, the prosecutor has a
fiduciary obligation to apprise his constituents of how he is managing the trust that they have
placed in him.").
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official in the jurisdiction, has the duty to inform the public about
criminal justice policy, threats to public safety, law enforcement
initiatives, and precautions the public can take to protect its
safety. 14 Third, a prosecutor is an advocate who has a dual
responsibility to convict the guilty and protect the innocent. 15 This
-advocacy role carries-the-greatest-potential to-inflict harm. As an
advocate, a prosecutor has a right to inform the public about
investigative and prosecutorial actions his office is undertaking
without endangering the right of those persons accused of crimes to
be treated fairly and impartially throughout the criminal justice
process. 16
The modes of speech by prosecutors and the protection afforded
public speech vary with the role then being played by the
prosecutor. Campaign speech, and speech on matters of public
concern, enjoy the greatest protection because such speech typically
is seen as legitimate and necessary to the democratic process and to
core functions of the prosecutor's work. 17 But when a prosecutor
speaks in the role of an advocate, and makes statements about
current prosecutions, such statements have the capacity to
It is with respect to
prejudice future criminal proceedings.18
advocacy speech that a prosecutor has to be most careful, and
except for limited facts about a case, a prosecutor as a general rule
has a duty to refrain from speaking. 19
14 See, e.g., id. ("[A] prosecutor's public comments to the media may promote public safety
by warning the public of continuing dangers in the community, or cautioning them about
particularly vulnerable activities or sources of risk.").
15 The role of a prosecutor "is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
16 BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 6.1 (1998).
17 See, e.g., Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 930 (1990) ("[P]rosecutor speech is entitled to first amendment
protection because the prosecutor retains a constitutional right to self-expression and because
").
the speech informs the public about matters of public concern ....
18 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811-12 (1987) ('Justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice,' and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents
the appearance of precisely the opposite." (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954)) (citation omitted)).
19 The duty of a prosecutor to keep silent during pending litigation is neither unreasonable
nor novel. In England, the Contempt of Court Act of 1981 prohibits the media from
publishing information that will prejudice ongoing legal cases and in particular trials before
jury. See Contempt of Court Act 1981, c. 49, § 2(2) (Eng.). The primary function of the
Contempt of Court Act is to protect the integrity of active court proceedings. See id. § 2(3). A
strict liability rule is introduced by the Act under which any conduct that "interfere[s] with
the course of justice," including extrajudicial statements by prosecutors, can be treated as
contempt of court even when there was no intention to interfere. See id. § 1. This rule
applies only to publications i.e. any form of communication addressed to any section of the
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To be sure, many prosecutors carefully weigh the necessity of
their public speech with the danger of public misinformation or of
compromising a defendant's right to a fair trial. But, equally
obvious is the fact that politics, power, and ego can drive much of
prosecutor speech. And with social media, the internet, and the
close relationship between a prosecutor and a voracious media eager
and able to obtain and disseminate widely a prosecutor's
statements, the danger to the system, and those accused of crime, is
apparent. As demonstrated below, despite some very clear rules
and standards, regulation of prosecutor speech is piecemeal and
inconsistent. The prosecutor's duty of silence may finally depend on
the prosecutor's own sense of fair play, justice, and ability to
exercise self-restraint.
Part II describes the various modes of prosecutor speech, and the
various roles of the prosecutor when speaking publicly. As I
demonstrate, a prosecutor can occupy three separate roles when
speaking: first, as a candidate for office engaged in campaign
speech; second, as a law enforcement expert speaking on matters of
public concern; and third, as an advocate speaking about pending or
impending cases. Part III describes the various legal and ethical
rules and standards that regulate and restrict a prosecutor's
extrajudicial speech. Finally, Part IV explains why a prosecutor
when engaged in speech as a partisan advocate has a duty to refrain
from speaking except for the basic information about cases he is
currently investigating and prosecuting.
II. TAXONOMY OF PROSECUTOR SPEECH

A. By Role
It is apparent that the permissible scope of a prosecutor's public
speech depends on (1) the role that the prosecutor is performing;
and (2) the forum in which the speech occurs. 20
That is, a
prosecutor communicating with the public may do so in three roles:
(1) as a campaigner for public office; (2) as a public official educating
and informing the public about issues of public importance; and (3)
21
as an advocate.

public or the public at large. Id. § 2(1).
20 See Matheson, supra note 17, at 868 & n.l, 886.
21 See id. at 885-86, 887, 888 (describing different roles that prosecutor play, such as
unique advocate, officer of the court, executive branch employee, and political actor).
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Thus, when a prosecutor runs for public office he engages in
speech that typically is afforded the greatest protection; campaign22
speech occupies a core function of First Amendment freedom.
Next, when a prosecutor communicates with the public about
matters of public concern, including matters that affect the
administration . of justice, -public- safety, .and. law- enforcement
policies, his speech is scrutinized more closely than campaign23
speech, but still is afforded considerable constitutional protection.
However, when a prosecutor functions in the role of an advocate,
and makes extrajudicial statements about specific cases, his public
statements are scrutinized much more closely and are subject to the
greatest restrictions in order to protect a defendant's right to a fair
24
trial.
1. Campaign Speech
The vast majority of prosecutors at the state and local level are
elected. 25 Campaign speech by prosecutors enjoys the greatest
degree of First Amendment protection. 2 6 As the Supreme Court
observed in giving broad protection to campaign speech by judges,
"'[d]ebate on the qualifications of candidates' is 'at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,' not at the
edges." 27 Indeed, if a judge-considered the most impartial and
non-partisan government official-may not be prohibited from
discussing his or her views on disputed legal and political issues, as
the Supreme Court held in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 28 then a fortiori the campaign speech by a prosecutor-part
of the politically partisan Executive Branch of government-would
29
be afforded even greater constitutional protection.

22

See infra Section ILA. 1.

23 See infra Section II.A.2.
24

See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.

25

See PETER A. JOY & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, DO No WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS

AND DEFENDERS 97 (2009) (estimating that 95 percent of chief prosecutors at state and local
level are elected).
26 See Brown v. Hartlage 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) ("It is simply not the function of
government to 'select which issues are worth discussing or debating' . . . in the course of a
political campaign." (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972))
(citation omitted)).
27 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002) (quoting Eu v. S.F.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1989)).
28 White, 536 U.S. at 788.
29 Id. at 805-06 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); and then quoting
Brown, 456 U.S. at 55).
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Campaign speech by prosecutors ordinarily poses far less danger
of impairing the judicial process or heightening public
condemnation of the accused, and restricting prosecutor speech for
these reasons clearly does not apply to a prosecutor's campaign
speech. Still, irresponsible campaign oratory by prosecutors does
occur, and has been censured. 30 Studies of prosecutor campaigns
suggest that most of the election speech by prosecutors focuses on
individual qualifications and character rather than prosecutorial
practices and policies. 31 Prosecutors often run on their record of
convictions, especially capital convictions. 32
A prosecutor is
forbidden to permit personal or political interests to affect his
prosecutorial conduct 33-including charging, plea-bargaining, and
sentencing practices-nor should a prosecutor make a campaign
pledge to prosecute a certain case. 34
A prosecutor's public
statements about a specific case at the same time the prosecutor is
engaged in a hotly-contested political campaign-District Attorney
Michael Nifong's prosecution of the Duke Lacrosse case 35-presents
an obvious impermissible conflict. 36 But the concurrence of a
prosecutor's advocacy speech with campaign speech is unusual.
2. Speech on Matters of Public Concern
When a prosecutor speaks about subjects that command the
public interest, such as victim's rights, public corruption, spousal
abuse, drugs, and guns, a prosecutor enjoys wide latitude; there is
no legitimate reason to restrict such speech. 37
However, a
prosecutor should resist speaking to the public on any of these
issues at a time when his office is prosecuting a case involving a

30 See, e.g., Vermont v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 854, 855 (Vt. 1980) (condemning a state
prosecutor for statements he made regarding a pending case during his re-election campaign).
31 See Ronald F. Wright, How ProsecutorElections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583,
591-92 (2009) (suggesting that prosecutor elections do not often force incumbents to explain
priorities and practices of the office, or larger patterns and values reflected in local criminal
justice, but rather about particular past cases).
32 See Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty:
The Ethics of ProsecutorialCandidates'Campaigningon Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 941, 945-47 (1994).

33 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
34 See JOY & MCMUNIGAL, supra note 25, at 97-98.
35 N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007).
36 See Matheson, supra note 17, at 888.
37

See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 302 (4th

ed. 2010) (discussing the importance of the prosecutor's role to inform the public about crimes
especially when the accused is still at large and potentially dangerous).
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defendant charged with that crime. 38 Thus, it would be entirely
proper for Michael Nifong to make public statements about campus
sexual abuse by Duke University students, or the dangers of
excessive alcohol at fraternity parties. But it would be improper to
make these statements while his office is prosecuting a student
charged with sexual abuse after drinking at a fraternity party. Similarly, there is nothing improper in a prosecutor speaking out
about the evil of public corruption, the public corruption cases he
has prosecuted, and the aggressive steps his office is taking to
investigate and prosecute public officials who violate their duty.
What is improper is to make such statements in conjunction with
his announcement of charges against a prominent public official in a
high-profile case, and sprinkling details of the charges and ad
hominem comments about the official's character.3 9 There is a real
danger that a prosecutor who makes relevant comments about
matters of public concern-clearly a legitimate function-may in.
the course of that speech adopt the advocacy role and deliberately .or
inadvertently make impermissibly prejudicial comments about
40
specific cases.
3. Advocacy Speech
With respect to advocacy speech, the ABA's Model Rules and
Prosecution Standards prohibit prosecutors from making public
statements that have a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding" or have a "substantial
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused...,."41
Federal rules are more restrictive; prosecutors are forbidden from
making public statements that "may reasonably be expected to
influence the outcome of a pending or future trial."42 It is with
respect to his advocacy speech that a prosecutor can inflict the
greatest damage.

Id. at 302, 304.
39 See, e.g., United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2015 WL 1608412, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 10, 2015) (describing U.S. Attorney Preet Bhahara's orchestration of a "media blitz" in
announcing corruption charges against New York State Speaker of Assembly Sheldon Silver).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d. 723, 725, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(discussing improper public comments by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft who, while
discussing law enforcement initiatives to fight terrorism, made erroneous and prejudicial
comments about defendant's culpability and credibility of government's key witness in
pending terrorist trial).
38

41

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a), 3.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013); STANDARDS FOR

CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.10(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 4th ed. 2015).
42 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (b)(2) (2015).
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A prosecutor's advocacy speech has a much greater capacity to
prejudice a defendant than when a prosecutor campaigns for office
or engages in speech about matters of public concern. When a
prosecutor speaks as an advocate about a specific case, the
prosecutor plays the role of a partisan whose interests are adverse
to individuals accused of crimes, and with the ability to unfairly
prejudice those persons by making public statements about the
accused, the evidence against him, and the prosecutor's opinions
about the case. 43 It is with respect to advocacy speech that a
prosecutor must be most careful about his public statements. A
prosecutor who investigates or prosecutes a specific individual may
make a public statement about that person that includes the
person's identity, some basic facts about the arrest, and some
comments about anticipated scheduling matters; 44 however, the
prosecutor must refrain from saying anything about the merits of
the case, the witnesses or other evidence, opinions as to guilt, or
anything else that might be taken as a comment on the case. 45 To
this extent, a prosecutor in his advocacy role has a duty to remain
silent.
B. By Forum
Regardless of which role the prosecution occupies, most of a
prosecutor's communication with the media and the public is about
current investigations and prosecutions. Experience shows that
this communication may take any of a variety of forms, each with
different potential for jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair
trial and the public's need for accurate information. Those fora are:
(1) press conferences; (2) press releases, press briefings, and
interviews; (3) electronic speech on the Internet and Twitter; (4)
unauthorized leaking of information; (5) appearances on TV as
"experts"; (6) authors of books and articles; and (7) producers of
"perp walks."

43 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 5, at 67 (discussing former prosecutor Mike Nifong's public
comments regarding the Duke lacrosse scandal, which included references to evidence from
the rape examination as well as the reprehensible conduct of the accused, that were found to
have violated North Carolina State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct as they impaired the
ability to have a fair trial); see Jonathan K. Van Patten, Suing the Prosecutor,55 S.D. L. REv.
214, 247 (2010) ("It [is] the [criminal defendants'] constitutional right to have the prosecutor
refrain from making any statements not relevant to their indictment and arrest which might
prejudice their obtaining a fair trial.").
44 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-14.3 (NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N 3d ed. 2009).
45 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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1. Press Conferences
The press conference is the most powerful forum for a prosecutor's
communication to the public. 46 The press conference is an elaborate
production in which the prosecutor usually announces an arrest,
often flanked.b-y other. high-ranking law enforcement officials and
47
surrounded with displays of contraband-drugs, guns, currency.
The prosecutor stands in front of microphones, TV cameras, lights,
and media people and announces a dramatic, provocative, and often
disparaging message about someone or some group of allegedly
dangerous criminals who have been apprehended and charged by
While the announcement of an arrest or
his or her office. 48
indictment is a legitimate matter of public concern and therefore
public comment, the content of press conferences often goes well
beyond the language of the complaint or indictment to include
comments about the defendant's supposedly criminal character and
probable guilt and favorable opinions about the credibility of the
government's witnesses and the strength of the evidence. 49 The
press conference has become such a fixture in the criminal justice
system that very few courts, disciplinary bodies, or commentators
have examined how often these presentations violate the ethical
rules and impair not only a defendant's right to a fair trial but also
the public's perception of the criminal justice system.
Examples abound. Prosecutors employ colorful, hyperbolic, and
often misleading rhetoric to hype the case, such as suggesting that
the defendant is guilty of 'the largest corruption ... in the history
of the nation"'50 or 'part of the largest marijuana operation in the
history of the county."' 51 Some prosecutors deliver even more
excitement: .'I'm not sure that we ever had a drug dealer of the

46 See, e.g., Gerald Stern, Trial by Lawyer Press Conference: Why is Such a Fanfare
Permitted?, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1985, at 17 ("The press conference generated massive publicity
in newspapers, and on radio and television.... The public-relations effort was so successful
that within six days of the press conference the prosecutor was twice on national television,
reiterating his rhetoric, opinions and commentary.").
41 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 5, at 81; Stern, supra note 46, at 17 (noting that a total of
seventeen officials were in attendance at New York City press conference).
48 See, e.g., id. at 17 (detailing the plethora of TV cameras, microphones, lights, and
photographers present at a New York press conference while the prosecutor described the
defendants with pejorative terms, noting the significance of their crimes).
49 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 37, at 303 (describing several egregious instances in
which prosecutors use the press conference to stigmatize defendants); Stern, supra note 46, at
18.
50 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 37, at 303.
51 Id.
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dimension of the defendant' ' 52 or .'[this indictment is shaped as a
javelin to drive deep into the heart of organized crime. Now the
mob is on the run."'5 3 A prosecutor at a press conference falsely
stated that a defendant charged with currency reporting violations
was involved in money laundering and drug trafficking.5 4 At a news
conference shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack,
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft falsely stated that three men
arrested on terrorism charges on September 17, 2001, were
"'suspected of having knowledge of the September 11th attacks."'5 5
Later, in a press conference giving an update in the War on Terror,
during the trial of the three men referred to above, referring to the
value of cooperating witnesses, Ashcroft described the testimony of
the cooperating witness, who had just completed his testimony, as of
"'substantial value' to the Government." 56 In fact, the witness's
57
testimony was later shown to be false.
Because press conferences pose special dangers of prejudicing a
case, some prosecutor offices have instituted guidelines to limit
prejudice when announcing charges or ongoing investigations.5 8
The guidelines provide that press conferences to announce formal
charges should be held only for the most significant and
newsworthy actions, or if a particularly important deterrent or law
enforcement purpose would be served, and that "[p]rudence and
caution should be exercised."5 9 The guidelines further provide that
no press conference should be held regarding ongoing matters
before formal charges are brought except in "exceptional
circumstances" such as reassuring the public when a particularly
heinous crime has been committed, alerting the public of an
imminent threat to public safety, or seeking public assistance or
60
information.
2. Press Releases, Briefings, and Media Interviews
In addition to press conferences, prosecutors commonly issue
press releases, give press briefings, and conduct media interviews.
52 See Stern, supra note 46, at 18.
53 Id.
54 See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1204 (1st Cir. 1996).
55 See United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
6 Id.
57 See supra note 9.
58 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-7.401 (2003)

(providing guidelines for press conferences and other media contacts).
59 Id. § 1-7.401(A).
60 Id. § 1-7.401 (C).
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Prosecutor offices have institutionalized media outreach initiatives
on a broad scale, presumably to maintain good relations with the
Offices typically
media and control irresponsible contacts. 61
designate a person to serve as a point of contact with the media,
coordinate press conferences, prepare press releases, coordinate
requests from media_ organizations regarding in-depth stories-andinterviews, and prepare displays and handouts for press conferences
and other media contacts. 62 Guidelines for press releases, briefings,
interviews, as well as supervision, authorization, and approval63 by
senior prosecutors varies with the particular office and the case.
High profile investigations and prosecutions generate the most
contacts and raise difficult and controversial questions about the
scope of media contacts, leaks to the media, and the prejudicial
effect of the prosecutor's statements. One of the most outrageous
examples involved the conduct of Manhattan prosecutor Linda
Fairstein, Chief of the Sex Crimes Unit of the New York County
District Attorney's Office, in the so-called "cybersex torture" case,
who made numerous statements, including a stream of leaks,
throughout the criminal proceedings. 64 The victim, a 20-year-old
college student, reported that she had been sexually assaulted by
Oliver Jovanovic, a thirty-year-old doctoral student who had tied
her up for twenty hours and burned, tortured, and violently raped
Throughout the criminal proceedings,
and sodomized her. 65
including a stream of leaks, Fairstein made numerous extrajudicial
statements:
'He terrorized this young woman to the point that she was
too frightened to call the authorities ... He tied her to a
chair, undressed her and tortured her with sex toys and
other objects for almost a full day; He tortured and sexually
abused the woman, burning her with candle wax, biting her,
sexually assaulting her and threatening to dismember her as
Jeffrey Dahmer, the serial killer, had done with his victims;
He. tied the woman's legs to a chair and gagged her before
sexually torturing her; He was so prepared for this and
carried it off so smoothly; We believe this was not the first
See, e.g., id. § 1-7.401.
See, e.g., id. §§ 1-7.220, 1-7.330, 1-7.401.
63 See, e.g., id. §§ 1-7.112, 1-7.310, 1-7.320 (noting the application of the guidelines
described therein involves discretion and good judgment, and also noting the distinction
between coordination efforts of various offices and agencies).
64 See Jovanovic v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 8437 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59165, at *1, *7, *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2006).
65 Id. at *4.
61
62
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time he did something like this; and We believe there are
66
other victims.'
Needless to say, Fairstein's comments made screeching headlines
in every local newspaper. One paper's cover page featured a full
page picture of the defendant with the headline: 'Prosecutor: Cyber
fiend struck before,"' 67 and 'HOW MANY MORE VICTIMS?' 68
Fairstein told the press that this case was her office's foray into
Internet-related sex prosecution and that the case represented "a
'whole new entry in the acquaintance-rape category."' 69 Fairstein
also used selected portions of e-mail correspondence between the
defendant and alleged victim that further demonized him.7 0 The
media coverage was so extensive that trial witnesses were
influenced in their testimony of critical facts by reading a
newspaper article.7 1 Jovanovic was found guilty by a jury, the
conviction was reversed for serious trial errors, and after seeking
generous plea deals involving no jail time, which the defendant
refused, the District Attorney agreed to dismiss all charges with
72
prejudice.
3. Tweeting and the Internet
Social media, including Twitter and the Internet, now allows a
prosecutor a previously unheard of quick, unusually wide, and easy
opportunity to transmit comments that arguably prejudice a

67

Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *8.

68

Id.

66

69 Id.
70 See

id. at *8-9.
See id. at *9.
72 See id. at *1-2. One could assume that Fairstein was aware of the risk that she would
jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial. See id. at *44. Consider her comment in an
interview with the Media Studies Journal about the effects of publicity on a jury:
The period of greatest impact is pretrial because that could be anywhere from three
months to a year. Depending on the coverage, people can become immersed in reading
about the case. And from this reading-and-listening public come (sic) the people who sit
on our juries. After the trial has begun, the jurors are given a rule-that they don't read
or listen to media accounts of the case. Most people try hard to comply. But it's almost
impossible with the highest-profile cases for it to really happen. When a case like
Chambers, the jogger, the subway bomber or the World Trade Center bomber is on trial
in New York-and it is literally a page Al headline--our jurors are coming to work on
the subway and the bus ...I mean you can't sit on a train and not see what's there ....
And you deal with a jury pool that is just saturated with that kind of information. You
hope that you get jurors who are telling you the truth, that they can set aside what
they've heard and just listen to the evidence in the courtroom. In the end, both sides use
the press to great advantage before you get anywhere near the trial stage.
Id. at *44-45.
71
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defendant. 73 "Tweets" also allow a prosecutor to refer the reader to
a link to other documents, such as the charging documents, press
releases, and other relevant materials.7 4 So, in the Silver case
discussed above, U.S. Attorney Bharara, after his press conference
and press release, transmitted tweets announcing the charges,
referred-readersto the-press release, and at the -same-time repeated
the statements he made earlier: "Silver monetized his position as
Speaker of the Assembly in two principal ways & misled the public
about his outside income" 75 and "[p]oliticians are supposed to be on
the ppl's [sic] payroll, not on secret retainer to wealthy special
interests they do favors for."76 Upon the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment based on the prosecutor's inflammatory pretrial statements, the federal district judge noted that one of the
problems with Twitter communications is that they are read out of
any context and isolated from any explanatory information. 77 Given
the restrictive platform-i.e., messages are limited to 140
characters and readers are permitted to "retweet" a single
communication 7 8 -the statements typically are read in isolation,
and the prejudice is enhanced. 79 A prosecutor by tweeting thereby
is afforded a simple and potentially highly prejudicial form of
communication.
Similarly, with the advent of the Internet, prosecutors are able to
post online anonymous comments about pending criminal cases.
Probably the most outrageous example of this relatively new
phenomenon occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana in the chaos
following Hurricane Katrina when several civilians were shot 'to
80
death in shootings by local police officers at the Danziger Bridge.
Before, during, and after the federal prosecution of these officers for
civil rights and conspiracy violations, three high-ranking federal
prosecutors posted online "anonymous comments to newspaper
articles about the case" under multiple assumed names that "were

73 See Emily Anne Vance, Note, Should ProsecutorsBlog, Post, or Tweet?: The Need for
New Restraints in Light of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 367, 406 (2015) (arguing that
rules restricting a prosecutor's extrajudicial speech have not been revised to account for
differences between traditional media and social media).
74 See id. at 404.
75 See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47194, at *19
n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015)).
76 Id.
77 See id. at *2,*18-19, n.8.
78 See id. at 19, n.8.
79 See id.
80 United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2015).
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inflammatory, highly opinionated, and pro-prosecution. 8 1
The
postings "castigated the defendants and their lawyers and ... [the
New Orleans Police Department (NOPD)] as a fish 'rotten from the
head down."'8 2 The postings contained confidential, privileged, and
sensitive information that spanned the entire prosecution and went
directly to the guilt of the defendants, the collective guilt of the
NOPD, and the incompetence and lack of integrity of defense
8 3
counsel.
When these postings came to light, and following motions by the
defendants, the district court in a lengthy opinion found that the
government's misconduct was so pervasive and so prejudicial to the
rights of the defendants that it "contaminated every phase of the
prosecution" and required vacating the convictions.8 4 The online
comments, according to the court, "breached all standards of
prosecutorial ethics, [and] gave the government a surreptitious
advantage in influencing public opinion, the [jury] panel, and the
trial itself."8 5 The government's misconduct permeated every stage
of the prosecution.
Anonymous public statements by prosecutors about pending and
impending cases, the court observed, undermine the integrity,
fairness, and objectivity of the criminal justice system.8 6 Indeed,
public statements on-the-record can be easily evaluated.8 7
Statements off-the-record cannot.8 8 Moreover, a prosecutor's duty to
refrain from speaking extends beyond confidential or grand jury
matters, and applies beyond those actually prosecuting a case to
every prosecutor in the office.8 9 Nor is there any dividing line
between a prosecutor's professional and private lives with respect to
the duty to remain silent. 90 Although statements to the press may
be an integral part of a prosecutor's job, that function is severely
limited by the prosecutor's responsibility to serve justice.

81 See id. at 339, 340, 341.
82 Id. at 341.
83 Id. at 344; see United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552, 598-99 (E.D. La. 2013),
aff'd, 799 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2015).
84 See Bowen, 799 F.3d at 351-52, 353 (citing Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 619); Bowen, 969
F. Supp. 2d at 627.
8-5Bowen, 799 F.3d at 353.
86 See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 574, 615.
87 See Bowen, 799 F.3d at 354, 356.
88 See Matheson, supra note 17, at 890-91.
89 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.10 (a) & (e) (AM. BAR ASS'N 4th ed. 2015).
88 See id. § 3-1.10 (a).
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4. Unauthorized Leaks
As noted above, prosecutors are limited in what they can say
about a case. The media, of course, are not so limited. Prosecutors
therefore have the ability to evade prohibitions on prejudicial
speech by leaking Anformation. to..the media that may. prejudice
persons who either are targets of an investigation or defendants in
current prosecutions.9 1 Anyone familiar with the criminal justice
system, if candid, would acknowledge that prosecutors leak
information to the media, and do it often. To be sure, leaking secret
information is not only unethical but sometimes it violates criminal
statutes, as when prosecutors reveal secret grand jury
92
information.
Prosecutors rarely get caught for leaks. Prosecutors confide in
friendly journalists, knowing that the "journalist's privilege" shields
the journalist from having to reveal the source of the leak, 93 and
that revealing a source would be destructive to the journalist's,
career. Moreover, even though it is often perfectly obvious that the
government, and usually the prosecutor, was the source of the leak,
prosecutors are easily able to deflect responsibility by
demonstrating that numerous individuals who would have had the
information about the matter that was leaked-either from
interviews, subpoenas, or testimony-plausibly may have been the
94
leaker.
5. Television Appearances as an "Expert"
Prosecutors occasionally appear on TV programs as iaw
enforcement "experts" ostensibly to educate the public about the
criminal justice system and ongoing criminal trials and
investigations. 95 When speaking about current criminal trials a
91 See Matheson, supra note 17, at 897.
92 See, e.g., Richard P~rez-Pefia, Pennsylvania Attorney General, Kathleen Kane, Charged
in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/O7/us/pennsylvania
(discussing Pennsylvania
-attorney-general-kathleen-kane-charged-in-leak-case.html?_r=0#
Attorney General charged with orchestrating the leak of confidential material to a
Philadelphia newspaper and then lying about it to a grand jury).
93 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972) (recognizing the privilege but finding
that grand jury's need for information outweighed privilege).
94 See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 17, at 891.
95 Some prosecutors have become celebrities by promoting themselves as TV
commentators.

See, for example, S. RICHARD BLASSBERG, THE JEANINE MACHINE 34 (2002),

profiling Jeanine Pirro, Westchester District Attorney. She frequently appeared on TV on
"Geraldo" and other programs during the O.J. Simpson trial. Id. Despite criticism of Pirro as
a self-seeking Hollywood-type celebrity and an insatiable "media hound," Pirro is an
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prosecutor must ensure that her commentary does not risk
prejudicing a specific criminal case by discussing the specific merits
of an ongoing criminal prosecution or investigation, although a
prosecutor may in a rare case address a "manifest injustice [about
which] the prosecutor is reasonably well-informed." 96 Presumably a
prosecutor would be allowed to criticize a judge for excluding a
defendant's confession on dubious legal grounds, a prosecutor's
suppression of exculpatory evidence, or a defense attorney's decision
97
not to call the defendant as a witness.
6. Books and Articles
Prosecutors frequently write books about their work, and often
describe some of their big victories. 98 Whether a prosecutor's
conduct in office may be influenced by future literary or media
interests is almost impossible to determine. Prosecutors must be
careful not to enter into a literary or media portrayal based on cases
in which the prosecutor was involved prior to the conclusion of the
case, nor should a prosecutor allow his judgment to be affected by
the possibility of future personal literary or other rights.99 If a
prosecutor does participate in a literary or media event in which the
prosecutor's office was involved, the duty to maintain confidentiality
must be respected.100
attractive and well-informed lawyer, and her presence on these shows probably gave some
measure of respectability to the nightly O.J. media orgy. Id.
96 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.10 (i) (AM. BAR ASS'N 4th ed. 2015).
97 See ld. § 3-1.10 (b)-(c). A prosecutor's TV appearance may be blatant public relations
disguised as a TV "documentary" to boost the prosecutor's image.
See, e.g., Joanne
Wasserman et al., Brooklyn DistrictAttorney CharlesHynes Gets his own Reality Show Ahead
of Democratic Primary, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS
(March
27,
2013,
4:30 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv-moviesb-klyn-charles-hynes-reality-showarticle- 1.1299899. A so-called news program called "Brooklyn D.A." featured prosecutors in
the office of Brooklyn D.A. Id.
Charles Hynes, whose office was currently battling
misconduct charges who discussed cases currently pending in the Brooklyn criminal courts,
and discussed evidence in the case that incriminated the defendant. See Joseph Berger, Suit
by a Prosecutor's Rival Seeks to Block a TV Show, N.Y. TIMES, (May 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/nyregion/rival-sues-to-block-tv-show-about-hynesbrooklyn-prosecutor.html; Wasserman et al., supra. Criticism of the show focused on alleged
violations of campaign finance laws by giving the prosecutor free airtime during a heated
political campaign. Id. Just as troubling, of course, are the extrajudicial comments by
prosecutors about pending cases, displaying evidence in those cases before the cases were
tried, and interviews with prosecution witnesses, including forensic experts who expressed
their opinions about incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Rita M. Glavin, Note, Prosecutorswho
Disclose ProsecutorialInformation for Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of
Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1809, 1838 (1995).
9s See id. at 1809.
99 See id. at 1814-15.
100 Id. at 1810.
Sometimes these books discuss high-profile cases that the writer
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7. "Perp Walk"
A prosecutor may engage in extrajudicial speech as effectively by
conduct as by verbal communications, particularly when the
conduct is tantamount to making a statement. The deliberate
escorting of am-arrested person-by police in-front of TV cameras and
news reporters as a means of shaming or pressuring the suspect
and garnering publicity for the prosecutor--commonly known as the
"perp walk" 1 0 1-is
well within the ethical rule that prohibits
extrajudicial comments that might prejudice an adjudicative
proceeding as well as heightening public condemnation of the
defendant. 102
Prosecutors justify the perp walk as a legitimate exercise of
discretion to (1) deter others from committing crimes; (2) ameliorate
public outrage at the defendant's alleged conduct; (3) 'encourage
guilty pleas and cooperation"'; (4) 'induce victims and witnesses to
come forward' with information"; (5) provide public access to,:the
operation of the justice system; and (6) expose a suspect's phySical
condition to avert charges of physical abuse.10 3 But commentators
have noted that the perp walk gives publicity-hungry prosecutors

prosecuted personally, without excessive self-glorification. Books such as "Helter Skelter,"
describing the celebrated 1970 trial of Charles Manson and his followers, and "Murder Along
the Way," describing three sensational murder trials in suburban Rockland County, New
York, are examples of riveting and vivid crime dramas that remain objective and descriptive.
See VINCENT BUGLIOSI & CURT GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MANSON
MURDERS 300, 323, 448, 489 (1974); KENNETH GRIBETZ & H. PAUL JEFFERS, MURDER ALONG
THE WAY: A PROSECUTOR'S PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF FIGHTING VIOLENT CRIME IN THE SUBURBS
46, 95(1989). Sometimes the book is a self-glorifying diatribe in florid prose against perceived
excesses in the criminal justice system. One such book, "To Punish and Protect," describes
the District Attorney's Office as the "battleground where the fight between good and evil
unfolds," in which the writer sees herself as the victim's "avenger," and to "[c]age the
[b]astards." JEANINE PIRRO & CATHERINE WHITNEY, TO PUNISH AND PROTECT: AGAINST A
SYSTEM THAT CODDLES CRIMINALS 1, 7 (2003). The death penalty works, and the insanity
defense is a "travest[y]." Id. at 186. While perhaps not unethical or illegal, this type of
hyperbole would seem to ignore the fact that these books do have the power to impact the
public's perception of law enforcement and crime, and should be written with that in mind.
101 See Caldarola v. Cty. of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 577 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding "Perp
walk," finding that arrestee's privacy interest was outweighed by legitimate government
interests). But see Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that staging a
"Perp walk" violated arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights).
102 The so-called "perp walk" was popularized by U.S. Attorney Rudolph Guiliani in 1987
when he locked up three Wall Street bankers "who were 'handcuffed and arrested at their
Since then other defendants-particularly White Collar suspects-have been
desk."'
subjected to the "perp walk." See Ernest F. Lidge III, Perp Walks and ProsecutorialEthics, 7
NEV.L.J. 55, 55 n.4 (2006); Leigh Jones, Perp Walk? Blame Guiliani, REUTERS, (May, 19,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eddie-strausskahn-perpwalkAM),
12:23
2011,
idUSTRE74H71720110518.
103 Lidge, supra note 102, at 66-67.
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an opportunity to enhance their careers and police a chance to get
on television. 104 The perp walk displays the accused in a way that
damages his character and stigmatizes him as guilty.105
In
suggesting guilt in this way the prosecutor is also conveying his
opinion about the accused, an illegitimate subject for comment. 10 6
The perp walk may also constitute a form of pre-trial punishment
and an erosion of the presumption of innocence. 10 7
III. REGULATING PROSECUTOR SPEECH
Extrajudicial statements by prosecutors are subject to a wide
array of legal and ethical rules that address the content,
circumstances, and timing of the statements.1 0 8
Whenever a
prosecutor speaks publicly, especially those prosecutors who are
elected, there is always the concern that the prosecutor's statements
may be influenced by the prosecutor's personal and political interest
in potential media contacts and attention. Almost everything a
prosecutor does or says may be motivated, at least in part, by
personal or political interests. Aware of this danger, the ethics
standards provide in several sections that a prosecutor's
professional judgment and conduct must never be influenced by
personal or political interest and considerations. 10 9 With respect to
the broad and recurring modes of speech discussed above, there is
always a special danger that a prosecutor's personal and political
interests might well conflict with a prosecutor's duty to do justice,
and the need to avoid speech that may prejudice the rights of an
accused or the administration of justice. However, absent an
admission by the prosecutor, it is difficult if not impossible to show
104See id. at 57, 72 (arguing that "perp walks" often violate prosecutor's ethical duties).
105 See id. at 61.
106 See id. at 58.
107 Id. at 60, 61.
108 See id. at 69-70.
109 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.6(a) (AM. BAR

ASS'N 4th ed. 2015) ("A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations, such as
partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion."); id. §
3-1.7(f) ("The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor's professional judgment or
obligations to be affected by the prosecutor's personal, political, financial, professional,
business, property, or other interests or relationships. A prosecutor should not allow
interests in personal advancement or aggrandizement to affect judgments regarding what is
in the best interests of justice in any case."); id. § 3-1.10(h) ("The prosecutor should not allow
prosecutorial judgment to be influenced by a personal interest in potential media contacts or
attention."); id. § 3-1.11(b) ("The prosecutor should not allow prosecutorial judgment to be
influenced by the possibility of future personal literary or other media rights."); id. § 34.4(b)(i) ("In exercising discretion to file and maintain charges, the prosecutor should not
consider partisan or other improper political or personal considerations.").
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that a prosecutor's public statements are motivated by a hidden
personal or political agenda rather than a disinterested desire to
protect the public and fight crime effectively. The typical inquiry by
courts and disciplinary bodies, however, is whether the statements,
viewed objectively, violate a legal or ethical rule regulating
prosecutor speech. 110
A. Statements About Pending Cases
A prosecutor in his advocacy role is allowed to make limited
public statements about pending cases.1" These matters include:
(a)[Defendant's] name, age, residence, occupation, family
status, and [other background information]; (b) The
substance or text of the charge; . . . (d) The identity of the
investigating and arresting agency, [and] the length and
scope of the investigation; (e) The circumstances . . .[of] the
arrest, including the time and place of arrest,... resistance,pursuit, possession and use of weapons, and a description of
112
items seized at the time of arrest.
A prosecutor is prohibited from making public statements about
pending cases that he knows or should know have a "substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an [adjudicative proceeding]" or
have a "substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation
of the accused."11 3 The rules identify several subjects that are more
likely than not to have a materially prejudicial impact on future
proceedings in a case. These subjects are generally seen as creating
a risk of prejudice without serving any legitimate or necessary law
enforcement function. 114 Thus, prosecutors are cautioned to refrain
from communicating on the following subjects:
[A] defendant's prior criminal record. . . . Observations
about a defendant's character. Statements, [particularly]
admissions [or] confessions, . . .attributable to a defendant,
or the [defendant's] refusal . . to make a statement.

110See In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1991) (citing La. State Bar Ass'n v. Karst,
428 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1983)).
- See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3), (6) (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2013); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-14.3 (NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N 3d
ed. 2009).
112 Id. § 2-14.3.
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a), 3.8(f); see 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (b)(4), (6);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10 (c); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-14.4.
114 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(6); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, r. 3.6, cmt. 5.
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Reference to investigative procedures such as fingerprints,
polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or laboratory tests,
or to the refusal by the defendant to submit to such tests or
examinations. Statements concerning the identity, . . . or
credibility of prospective witnesses. Statements concerning
evidence or argument in the case ....
[O]pinion[s] as to the
of guilty .... 115
plea
a
of
possibility
the
or
accused's guilt,
In addition, prosecutors should refrain from communicating the
fact that a defendant has been charged, unless there is also "a
statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and
that the [accused] is presumed innocent."'116
Examples of prosecutors speaking about these subjects are legion.
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara's announcement of the corruption
charges against New York State Speaker Sheldon Silver, which
created a "media circus" due to his over-the-top "uncensored views"
disparaging Silver's character, announcing his opinion on Silver's
guilt, and bundling together factual allegations with a broad attack
on public corruption and Silver's crimes. 117 Additionally, District
Attorney Michael Nifong, in a succession of numerous press
statements about the Duke Lacrosse case, demonized the three
defendants charged with raping a woman at a party as "a bunch of
hooligans" who committed a "gang rape" based on "racial hostility,"
denounced them for not "want[ing] to admit to the enormity of what
they ha[d] done," branded their conduct as "offensive,"
"unconscionable," "reprehensible," "appall[ing]," asserted that they
were "not telling the truth about it," and also stated his opinion that
"a rape did occur," that he was "convinced there was a rape," and
that the evidence of the victim's demeanor and trauma "was
certainly consistent with a sexual assault."1 18
As the cases
progressed, it turned out that a rape did not occur, the victim lied,
and the young men accused of rape were innocent. 11 9

115 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(4), (6).
116 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 8-1.1(a), (c)(1).
117 See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2015 WL 1608412, at *3, *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 10, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118 See N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, 06 DHC 35, (N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
119See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications:
A FundamentalFailure to "Do Justice",76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337-38 (2007).

2015/2016]

The Prosecutor's Duty of Silence

1205

B. Statements About Past Cases
A prosecutor's comments on past cases might be made in
connection with each role that a prosecutor performs. For example,
during an election campaign a prosecutor might try to tout as a
measure of ..her -effectiveness her record of.previous convictions,
Similarly, a prosecutor when
including capital convictions. 120
discussing law enforcement policy, the need to strengthen laws with
respect to certain types of investigations, or the need for additional
and
investigations
previous
to
allude
might
resources
prosecutions. 121 Finally, a prosecutor in commenting on a current
case might seek to highlight the case by describing a systemic
problem, or a troubling pattern of similar cases that have been
prosecuted.122
To be sure, from an ethical standpoint, the correct way to
approach statements about previous investigations, prosecutions,..
and convictions is to inquire what the prosecutor's purpose is ,in
discussing these cases, whether that purpose is legitimate and
necessary, and whether the statements are inconsistent with .a
23
prosecutor's role to serve justice.
C. Responsive Statements
A prosecutor is allowed to respond to public statements from any
source in order "to protect the prosecution's legitimate official
interests."'124 A prosecutor should not use this privilege to engage in
overkill; responsive statements should be limited to such'
information that is necessary to mitigate the adverse publicity, not

120

See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, Killing for Votes: The Dangers of Politicizing the Death

Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/killing-for-votes

(last

visited Jan. 24, 2016); Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, (July 15, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/16/magazine/the-deadliest-da.html?pagewanted=all
(describing Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham's political campaign for death
penalty, which she sought more than any other prosecutor in U.S.).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 729, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(describing public statements of United States Attorney General John Ashcroft in connection
with government's efforts in the war on terror).
122 A recent example is the overheated public comments of U.S. Attorney Preet Bhahara on
the systemic problem of official corruption. See infra text accompanying notes 202-10.
123

See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 14 cmt. (NAT'L DISTRICT ATT'Ys ASS'N 3d ed.

2012).
124 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10(f) (AM. BAR
ASS'N 4th ed. 2015); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013);
NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-14.5.
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exacerbate it.125
Prosecutors may not respond when their
statements have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a
criminal proceeding.126
A prosecutor's ability to respond is permitted in order to equalize
the positions of both sides, or correct misstatements about the
prosecutor's conduct. 127 To the extent that this rule allows a
prosecutor to "fight fire with fire," it may encourage a judiciallysanctioned "free-for-all" and, once provoked, may encourage
excesses by prosecutor.1 28 The Supreme Court in United States v.
Young 29 considered the scope of a prosecutor's response during a
trial, although admittedly in a different context. 130 The Court did
not approve the prosecutor's response, albeit invited by defense
counsel provocation, but did not find it to be plain error.1 31 The
proper test should be whether the prosecutor's response was
reasonably designed to repair the damage, rather than aggravate
it.1 32
D. Reference to Public Records
Although a prosecutor is prohibited from making materially
prejudicial extrajudicial statements, the ethics rules create an
exception that allows a prosecutor to make extrajudicial statements
about information contained in a public record, apparently despite
its content. 33 This "safe harbor" exception 134 obviously creates
broad opportunities for prosecutors to make highly prejudicial

125 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10() ("A
statement . . . shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent
adverse publicity."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(c) ("A statement ... shall be
limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity."); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-14.5 ("A public comment ... shall be limited to statements
reasonably necessary to mitigate the effect of undue prejudice created by the public statement
of another.").
126 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10(f); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-14.4.
127 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985) (noting the prosecutor's ability to
respond in order to right the scale); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.6.
128

See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-2.1(e).

129

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).

130 Id. at 2, 5-6, 9-10.
131

See id. at 5, 14, 20.

132 See id. at 12-13.
133 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a), (b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("[A]

lawyer may state ... information contained in a public record.").
1234See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991) ("[Pjrovides a safe
harbor for the attorneys, listing a number of statements that can be made without fear of
discipline ... ").
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statements that are contained in public records, or to actually file
court documents that contain information that a prosecutor is
barred from expressing directly. 135 This "safe harbor" exception
presents an attractive opportunity for prosecutors to create
damaging public records and then disseminating these records to
36
. the media directly, or alert the media to their -existence.
Moreover, the meaning of "public records" has generated
Some prosecutors have exploited this
considerable confusion.
exception to disseminate publicly highly prejudicial information
contained not only in "public records" of a court or other government
agency, but also materials publicly available on the Internet and
other news accounts previously reported in the media. 137 Adopting
such an expansive concept of a public record that includes unfiltered
and untested contents of all publicly accessible media "would permit
to swallow the general rule of
the public record safe harbor
138
restricting prejudicial speech."
The public record exception does not give a prosecutor cart
blanche to gratuitously place prejudicial information in a public
1 39
record in order to have that information reported by the media.
An egregious example in a federal criminal fraud trial in which the
defendant was accused of misappropriating funds from the federal
140
housing administration can be found in Henslee v. United States.
During the trial the prosecutor filed a "motion" with the clerk of the
federal district court, although as the appeals court observed, "the
141
true character and purpose of which [was] not readily apparent."
The motion referred to a report of a civil settlement between the
defendant and the housing agency having no connection with the
criminal case, and which described the defendant's "breaches,"
"conversion[s],"
"kick-backs,"
"embezzle[ments],"
and other
142
The motion garnered immediate and
of law.
violations

135 See Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 557, 567 (Md.

2003).
136

See id. at 554, 554-55, 555.

137 See, e.g., In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (Ind.2012) (noting that news stories about

the case could be accessed from the Internet); Gansler, 835 A.2d at 554, 554-55, 555
(describing information in the public domain, such as public court documents, media reports,
and comments made by police officers).
138 See In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d at 1247.
139

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10 (AM. BAR

ASS'N. 4th ed. 2014) ("A prosecutor should not place statements or evidence into the court
record to circumvent this Standard.").
140 See Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1957).
141 Id.
at 192.
142

Id.
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widespread publicity. 143 Although the jury was polled by the trial
judge and did not respond when asked if it had heard news reports
connected with the case, the Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed
the conviction, finding that the prosecutor's self-serving and
irrelevant statements
may have tainted the jury and
"damage[ed] ... the cause of justice. 1 44
The public record exception assuredly was not intended to allow
prosecutors to smear a defendant indirectly by creating purposeless
and illegitimate records. 145 Prosecutors, however, are able to file
documents in a case lawfully that may inflict substantial prejudice
on a defendant. For example, the federal prosecution of Sheldon
Silver, New York State Assembly Speaker, was initiated by "a 35page, single-spaced, sealed Complaint" which described in vivid and
inflammatory detail the defendant's scheme to bribe, secure
kickbacks, and extort millions of dollars from private lawyers and
others.1 46 The complaint disingenuously referred to witnesses by
anonymous identifiers but which were easy for the media to identify
by name, described the defendant's "corrupt arrangement with the
real estate law firm" which, according to the complaint, "ha[d] no
connection to his official position," and asserted that several
government witnesses were "reliable."1 47 The prosecutor then
quickly leaked the complaint to the media to set the stage for the
defendant's arrest the next day, followed by the press conference
extravaganza. 148
It would seem that if a prosecutor sought to take advantage of the
protection of the public record safe harbor, the prosecutor ought not
be allowed to provide information beyond quoting from and making
reference to the public record, and making clear that what is being
disclosed is the contents of the public record and not the
prosecutor's own opinion about the evidence and the defendant's
143 See id. at 192, 193.

See id. at 193-94.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
146 United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2015 WL 1608412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
10, 2015); see also Complaint at 1, 5, 35, United States v. Silver, 2015 WL 1608412 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (No. 15-CR-93 (VEC)) (providing specific details of the defendant's alleged misconduct).
147 Id. at 13, 17, 22 n.7, 24 n.8.
148 See Silver, 2015 WL 1608412, at *5, *5 n.6 ("This is not to say that the Court approves
of leaks of sealed information or credits the idea that these particular leaks did not originate
in the Government's camp."). It should be fairly obvious that the government was responsible
for improperly leaking news of Silver's arrest to the press hours before the Complaint was
unsealed or the arrest was made. Nevertheless, as the District Court observed, "the
speculative news stories published between 1:55 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on the day of Silver's
arrest could hardly have had any prejudicial impact inasmuch as Silver was arrested, the
Complaint was unsealed and he appeared in court later that day." Id. at *5.
144
145
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guilt.
The prosecutorial tactic of inserting prejudicial information into a
public record and then alerting the media may be a trap for the
For example, during a secret grand jury
unwary litigant.
investigation a prosecutor subpoenas witnesses and documents.
Assuming a witness-moves to quash the .subpoena, it would not be
surprising if the prosecutor's response contained highly prejudicial
and even inflammatory information to support the subpoena.
Obviously if such motion practice occurs during a grand jury
proceeding, all of these undisputedly public records should be filed
under seal, and not accessible to the media. 149 Whether the media
learns about these filings, of course, depends on whether the
information is leaked to the media.
Although there is no settled definition of "public record," several
courts have refused to extend the concept to include all information
that is publicly accessible on the Internet and in media reports. 150.
These courts have limited the concept of public record to "refer only.,
to public government records, i.e., the records and papers on file
with a government entity to which an ordinary citizen would have
'151
lawful access.
E. Statements Prejudicialto the Administration of Justice
as
A prosecutor's extrajudicial statements may be so irresponsible 152
justice.
of
administration
the
to
to constitute conduct prejudicial
This broad standard of professional misconduct covers advocacy
statements that materially prejudice a specific adjudicative
proceeding, which was one of the bases for disbarring Michael
Nifong, the Duke lacrosse prosecutor. 15 3 Also subject to sanctions
are improper comments by prosecutors aimed not at a specific legal
proceeding but more generally at matters the prosecutor believes
149 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6) ("Records ... must be kept under seal to the extent
and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring before a
grand jury.").
150See In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (Ind. 2012) (agreeing with the Gansler
definition of public record); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d
548, 569 (Md. 2003) ("[Public record information] should refer only to public government
records-the records and papers on file with a government entity to which an ordinary citizen
would have lawful access.").
151In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d at 1247 (citing Gansler, 835 A.2d at 569).
1652See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("It is professional

misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.").
153See Mosteller, supra note 119, at 1338, 1348-49; supra notes 33-36, 118-19 and
accompanying text.
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are of public concern in the criminal justice system. 154 Although, as
noted above, a prosecutor has much greater leeway in speaking out
on matters of public concern, his public statements may be so
irresponsible as to constitute conduct prejudicial to the
155
administration of justice.
Prosecutors occasionally make public statements critical of judges
and the justice system. Ethics rules address such statements
indirectly. Prosecutors are cautioned that any statements about the
judiciary and the justice system, especially statements expressing
disagreement, should be "respectful."1 56 However, some public
statements about judges and the justice system cross the line, and
prosecutors have been cited by professional disciplinary bodies for
1 57
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Prosecutors know that they occupy a special status with the public
as the embodiment of law and order.1 58 They know that in contrast
to criticism by defense lawyers, a prosecutor's criticism of judges
and the justice system is likely to carry far more weight with the
public, and affect adversely the public's confidence in the judiciary,
and the administration of justice generally. 159
A prosecutor's extrajudicial statements about the conduct of
judges and the operation of the justice system may be so
irresponsible and prejudicial to the administration of justice as to
warrant disciplinary sanctions.1 60 Needless to say, a prosecutor's
attack on judges makes for good press and may enhance a
prosecutor's image as an aggressive crusader against lawless
judges. Thus, an Arizona prosecutor's relentless attack on judges
and other public officials for obstructing his efforts at fighting
corruption led to his disbarment. 161 Andrew Thomas, the Maricopa
County prosecutor, publicly accused judges of lawless, biased, and
corrupt conduct. 162 A flow of press releases repeatedly charged that

154 See, e.g., In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (ruling that an
attorney was subject to sanctions when he made a comment alleging that a judge was
practicing bad criminal justice policy).
155 See id.; supra note 17 and accompanying text.
156

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10(b) (AM.

BAR ASS'N 4th ed. 2015).
157 See, e.g., In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1991); Zimmerman v. Bd. of Profl
Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757, 758, 762, 763 (Tenn. 1989); In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 234,
235.
158 See Vance, supra note 73, at 373.
159 See id. at 373, 406.
160 See, e.g., In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
161 See In re Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, slip op. at 25-26, 171, 232 (Ariz. 2011).
162 See id. at 3, 60, 66-67.
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a judicial faction was dodging the law and demonstrating a
disregard for the will of the people and engaged in a conspiracy to
thwart his investigations into judges and other public officials. 163
Without any supporting evidence, Thomas brought a civil RICO
complaint against 14 persons, including four judges. 164 Employing
an amalgam of-invective,-.insinuation-and diatribe, he charged the-defendants with a massive conspiracy to engage in judicial and
official misconduct, including extortion, bribery, hindering
165
prosecution, and obstructing government administration.
Thomas had the complaint dismissed a few weeks after he filed it,
claiming, falsely, that the United States Department of Justice
would be investigating the matter. 166
Other public attacks by prosecutors against judges may be so
reckless as to constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Thus, a New York prosecutor issued a "news alert" that
publicly attacked a judge who, according to the prosecutor, during a.
trial on charges of sexual misconduct, in his robing room, ordered'
the victim to get down on the floor and show the position she was'in
when she was attacked.1 67 As it turned out, the allegation against
the judge was false, and the prosecutor's public release of the
allegation was unwarranted and unprofessional, and properly
subject to discipline.1 68 Similarly, a prosecutor's public attack on
judges for not being aggressive enough may constitute misconduct,
as in one case where the prosecutor publicly, and falsely, branded a
judge's decision as a "get-out-of-jail-free card for every criminal
1 69
defendant in New York State."
F. Speech Criticalof a Verdict
A verdict
prosecutor
deficiencies
improperly

that disappoints a prosecutor may be an occasion for the
to criticize the jury or the judge, or comment on
in the justice system, and suggest that the defendant
beat the system. The prosecutor in this way saves face.

163 See Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, 46 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
327, 336 (2014).
164 See In re Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, slip op. at 106.
165 See id. at 114, 115, 130.
166 See Sarah Fenske, Andrew Thomas, Joe Arpaio Dismiss RICO Claim Against County
Officials-Ask Justice Department to Investigate Instead, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, (Mar. 11,
2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/andrew-thomas-joe-arpaio-dismiss6
08.
rico-claim-against-county-officias-ask-justice-department-to-investigate-instead-6630
167 In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1991).
168 See id.
169 In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234-35 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
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However, a prosecutor should not make statements critical of a
verdict, whether by a judge or jury. 170 Given the prosecutor's
authority and prestige, such remarks risk improperly influencing
jurors in other cases to which they may sit.1 7 1 It may also be seen
as intimidating a judge when a case is tried without a jury.
G. Statements Referring to Severity of Sentence
It is unethical for prosecutors to promote themselves and their
office, either in campaigning for office or in other public statements,
by claiming that the sentences that have been imposed in
prosecuted cases demonstrate that the prosecutor has been an
effective and aggressive official. 172
Such statements are
inconsistent with a prosecutor's role as a minister of justice,
whereby a prosecutor has a duty to maintain an attitude of fairness
and objectivity, rather than suggest an attitude motivated by
vengeance and retribution.1 73 Rather, the prosecutor should seek to
ensure that the sentencing process is done in a fair and equitable
manner.
H. Statements About Conviction Rates
Prosecutors like to promote their conviction rates as a measure of
their effectiveness. 74 Those prosecutors who campaign for office
often make their record of convictions the most significant factor
that the public, should consider in determining the prosecutor's
fitness for the position. 75 Flaunting conviction rates is not only

170

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-5.10 (AM. BAR ASS'N

2014) ("The prosecutor should not make public comments critical of a verdict, whether
rendered by judge or jury.").
171 See Joseph R. Daughen, Jury Duty: Low Pay, Lots of Hassle, and Now Fear Experts say
Some are Afraid to Serve, PHILLYCOM (May 4, 1992), http://articles.philly.com/1992-05-

04/news/260 11813 1jurors-prospective-panelists-jury-duty.
172

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-7.2(a) ("The

severity of sentences imposed should not be used as a measure of a prosecutor's
effectiveness."); Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death
Penalty: The Ethics of ProsecutorialCandidates' Campaigningon Capital Convictions, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 941, 943 (1994).
173 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 135 n.43, 153-54 (2004).
174 See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial'" When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal

Convictions, 9 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541, 542 (1996); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is

not Whether you Win or Lose, it is How you Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping
Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?,38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 290 (2001).
175 See Bresler, supra note 174, at 541.
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misleading, it is unethical. 176
IV. THE PROSECUTOR'S

DUTY OF SILENCE

Given the several roles that a prosecutor performs, and the broad
opportunities for a.prosecutor to speak outside the courtroom, the
idea that a prosecutor has a "Duty of Silence" seems far-fetched.
Indeed, a prosecutor's public statements are often not only
permissible but sometimes indispensable. A prosecutor's campaign
speech describing his work and fitness for office is critical to the
proper functioning of democracy, and enjoys the greatest
constitutional protection for speech. 177 A prosecutor's speech that
informs the public about the prosecutor's activities, educates the
public about law enforcement plans and priorities, and informs the
public about matters of public concern and threats to the public
welfare and safety, also enjoys considerable constitutional
protection.1 7 8 However, the broad protection given to campaign,,
speech and speech on matters of public concern is based on the
assumption that such speech promotes necessary and legitimate
objectives.1 79 That is not the case with extrajudicial speech that
does not serve legitimate prosecutorial interests, such as statements
concerning pending or impending cases, and individuals suspected
or accused of wrongdoing.1 80 Any interest a prosecutor might have
in speaking about these cases, or the public might have in learning
from the prosecutor about these cases, is overridden by the
constitutional right of persons accused of crime to receive a fair trial
by an impartial jury. 11 Thus, press conferences, press releases;
interviews, postings and leaks that occur after a defendant has been
accused of a crime are most likely to prejudice the potential jury
pool, i.e., the public. 18 2 With respect to speaking about pending
cases, a prosecutor has a duty to remain silent.
176 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4 (b)(i) (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2014) ("In exercising discretion to file and maintain charges, the prosecutor should
not consider . . . partisan or other improper political or personal considerations."); id. § 3-3.9
(d) ("In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to ... a desire
to enhance his or her record of convictions.").
177 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
180 See In re Amendments to Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, 2005 S.C. LEXIS
199, *205, "216-17 (S.C. June 20, 2005); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Gansler,
835 A.2d 548, 559, 560 (Md. 2003).
181 See id. at 559-60.
182 See United States v. King, 192 F.R.D. 527, 533 (E.D. Va. 2000); Gansler, 835 A.2d at

559.
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The prosecutor's duty of silence flows from several sources. First,
as the most powerful figure in the American criminal justice
system, the prosecutor has the power to employ, lawfully, "the most
terrible instruments of government" to deprive persons of their
liberty, destroy their reputations, and even bring about their
death 18 3 It is the prosecutor alone who decides whether or not to
bring criminal charges, who to charge, what charges to bring,
whether a defendant will stand trial or plead guilty, and whether to
confer immunity from prosecution.18 4 A prosecutor literally holds
the power to invoke or deny punishment.186 And a prosecutor's
discretion to exercise these powers is virtually unlimited, and rarely
second-guessed by the courts.1 86 Indeed, the ability of courts,
disciplinary bodies, and other investigative agencies to impose
significant restraints on a prosecutor's use of his powers is so
negligible that it makes the prosecutor accountable to himself
alone. 18 7 As the Supreme Court darkly observed: "[b]etween the
private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation
stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ
the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given
18 8
individual."
Moreover, a prosecutor has the legal and ethical duty to serve not
a private client, or his own personal or political interests, but rather
the interest of justice.18 9 Unlike a defense attorney, a prosecutor is
considered a quasi-judicial official, indeed a "Minister of Justice,"190
who has the dual responsibility to convict the guilty and protect the
innocent. 191
Long ago, the Supreme Court gave the classic
description of the prosecutor's role to serve justice, to play by the
rules, and not hit below the belt:
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern

See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 37, at 286.
See id.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 288-89.
187 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral
Standard for the Prosecutor'sExercise of the ChargingDiscretion,20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513,
513 (1993).
188 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).
189 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 37, at 287.
183
184

190 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("A prosecutor

has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014) ("The

prosecutor is an administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an officer of the court.").
191 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra, note 37, at 288.
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impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
..escape or innocence suffer. -He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as192it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
As this essay shows, a prosecutor can commit "foul blows" by
speech as well as conduct. But in contrast to other principal actors
in the criminal justice system, such as judges and defense lawyers,
a prosecutor's "foul speech" has a much greater potential to
prejudice the public. A prosecutor's speech needs to be considered
within a culture that glorifies prosecutors, views the prosecutor-as
protecting the community and rule of law against lawbreakers, sees
the prosecutor as a special guardian and protector of the truth, and
thus trusts the prosecutor's assertions, judgments, and opinions
about a case and individuals accused of crimes. Famous New York
District Attorneys like William Travers Jerome, Thomas E. Dewey,
and Frank S. Hogan have been lionized for their aggressive pursuit
193
and prosecution of murderers, gangsters, and corrupt officials.
Dewey was the inspiration for the character in the popular radio
show "Mr. District Attorney," with its memorable preamble: "Mr.
District Attorney[!] Champion of the People[!] .. .guardian of our
of happiness.' ' 94

fundamental rights-life, liberty, and the pursuit
The media celebrates prosecutors. TV shows such as "Law and
Order," "CSI," and "Brooklyn D.A." portray the prosecutor as tough,
Rather than refraining from
honorable, and courageous. 95
reinforcing that image, some prosecution speech stokes the flames.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
193See David Ray Papke, Mr. District Attorney: The Prosecutor During the Golden Age of
Radio, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 781, 781, 787 (2003); History of the Office, N.Y. COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, http://manhattanda.org/history-office#1119 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015);
Jerome Reviews his Official Years, TWAINQUOTES.COM, http://www.twainquotes.com/
19090508.html (last visited June 29, 2016).
194 Papke, supra note 193, at 781, 787.
195 See, e.g., Ronald M. Sandgrund, Does Popular Culture Influence Lawyers, Judges, and
Juries?-PartIII, 44 COLO. L. 51, 54 (2015).
192
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Moreover, as demonstrated above, 196 prosecutors are able to use
the public forum effectively because they have always enjoyed an
extremely close relationship with the media. Reporters typically try
to cultivate an acquaintance with prosecutors. Reporters know that
it's the prosecutor who effectively dominates the criminal justice
system, knows about current investigations, about the prominent
targets and cooperating witnesses, and possesses and controls the
evidence of guilt. Reporters would be foolish to alienate these
fruitful sources. The press also cultivates a close relationship with
prosecutors.
They have frequent contacts, 197 they dine with
prosecutors, 198 they flatter them by writing and broadcasting
favorable news accounts, 199 and they strenuously avoid behavior
that might discourage prosecutors from providing future scoops.
Prosecutors have stated publicly that "the press . . . ha[s] to be nice
to me." 20 0 With such a favorable outlet for their public commentary,
prosecutors know that they can control the information they wish to
disseminate, shape the way the media and ultimately the public
views the disclosures. And if a prosecutor chooses to divulge secret,
confidential, or privileged information to a friendly reporter, the
prosecutor is confident that given their close relationship, as well as
the privilege protecting news sources, the prosecutor's identity will
never be revealed.
A recent example is the manner in which Preet Bharara, United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, conceived
and carried out his media "brinksmanship" relative to the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 20 1
Bharara launched his
extrajudicial "blitz" by leaking to the media a "35-page, singlespaced sealed Complaint charging . . . [Sheldon] Silver, the thenSpeaker of the New York Assembly, with ...fraud, conspiracy, and
extortion." 20 2 After the complaint was unsealed, and Silver was
arrested and processed, Bharara held a press conference in which
he castigated the widespread corruption in Albany ("show-me-themoney culture of Albany") and offered gratuitously his subjective

See supra Part II.B.
e.g., Paul R. Wallace, Prosecutingin the Limelight, 22 DEL. L. 20, 21 (2005).
198 See Matheson, supra note 17, 889-90. Many journalists and reporters asked me to
lunch, often, and I usually acquiesced.
196

.97 See,

199 KENDALL COFFEY, SPINNING THE LAW: TRYING CASES IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
242 (2010).
200 Id. at 242.
201 See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2015 WL 1608412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 10, 2015).
202
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opinion of Silver's character (dishonest, "greedy," and engaged in
"secret self-reward" cleverly and cynically). 20 3 In case anyone
missed the press conference, Bharara issued an inflammatory press
release highlighting these same themes (charges against Silver part
of the "culture of corruption" in Albany; charges against Silver "go
to the very core of -what ails Albany"; 20 4 "Politicians are supposed to
be on the people's payroll, not on secret retainer to wealthy special
interests they do favors for[;]"205 Silver represents a "lack of
transparency, lack of accountability, and lack of principle joined
20 6
with an overabundance of greed, cronyism, and self-dealing"). 20 7
Bharara followed the release with similar comments via Twitter.
The following day-the timing was deliberate-Bharara gave a
speech at a local law school covered massively by the media, in
which he lampooned Silver, ridiculed his conduct as "business as
usual."20 8 Finally, a few weeks later, Bharara gave an interview
with a journalist in which after noting the importance of public
"
corruption prosecutions he added:
[W]hen you see somebody who's been charged with (and,.
we've convicted many, many people before this case)-and
you see somebody who has basically sold his office to line his
pockets and compromised his integrity and ethics with
respect to how to make decisions on all those issues I
mentioned that affect people's lives, that's a big problem.
20 9
And it's a big problem for democracy.
A prosecutor also needs to be silent because the consequences of
his speech are so grave. As Holmes reminded, a criminal trial must
be carried out in a courtroom, not in the media. 210 A criminal
defendant is guaranteed a fair trial by an impartial jury. 21 1 Indeed,
the right to a fair trial is "the most fundamental [right] of all
freedoms." 212 Moreover, the components of a fair trial-public trial
by an impartial jury-do not necessarily insure a fair trial when a
prosecutor may have previously tainted the proceeding by
irresponsible public statements about evidence that may never get

205

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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Id.

207

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 458, 462 (1907).
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 559 (1965).
See id. at 540 ("[A] fair trial [is] the most fundamental of all freedoms.").
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admitted, confessions that are inadmissible, comments about the
defendant's character, and opinions about the defendant's guilt.2 13
The Supreme Court articulated this overriding concern in Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada,214 a case involving public statements by a
defense lawyer:
The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial
jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based on
materials admitted into evidence before them in a court
proceeding. Extrajudicial comments on, or discussion of,
evidence which might never be admitted at trial and ex parte
statements by counsel giving their version of the facts
215
obviously threaten to undermine this basic tenet.
V. CONCLUSION

The protections afforded prosecution speech vary with the role of
the prosecutor and the forum in which the speech is communicated.
Campaign speech, and speech on matters of public concern, enjoy
the greatest protection because such speech is typically seen as
legitimate and necessary to the democratic process and to core
functions of the prosecutor's work. This type of speech most often
appears in press conferences or press briefings. But when a
prosecutor speaks in the role of an advocate, and makes statements
about current prosecutions, as an expert on TV, or on the internet,
such statements have the capacity to prejudice future criminal
proceedings. It is with respect to advocacy speech that a prosecutor
has to be most careful, and except for limited facts about a case, a
prosecutor as a general rule has a duty to refrain from speaking.
In our system, politics, power, and ego may well drive much
prosecutor speech. Further, a prosecutor's potential relationship
with a media that is eager and able to obtain and disseminate the
See supra notes 5-6, 44-45 and accompanying text.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
215 Id. at 1070. It is noteworthy that the Court was referring to extrajudicial statements
not by a prosecutor but by defense counsel. See id. at 1034. It is not unreasonable to suggest,
as noted above, that while extrajudicial statements by all lawyers can be prohibited,
extrajudicial statements by a prosecutor have a far greater potential to prejudice a jury than
statements by the defendant's lawyer, and extrajudicial statements by a prosecutor can be
more readily restricted. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing the standard of
scrutiny used for extrajudicial statements by prosecutors); see supra Part III. And lest we
forget, a prosecutor's statements that refer to evidence that may never be admitted at trial, or
contain opinions on a defendant's character and guilt, have the potential to contribute to the
conviction of an innocent person. See supra notes 42, 44-45 and accompanying text. Indeed,
as several cases discussed above show, the danger of a prosecutor's irresponsible statements
contributing to a wrongful conviction is real. See supra notes 5-6.
213
214
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prosecutor's statements highlights a danger to the system and to
Regulation of prosecutor speech is
those accused of crimes.
piecemeal and inconsistent. It may be that the only meaningful
control is the prosecutor's own sense of fair play, integrity, desire to
do justice, and self-restraint.

